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Part I.  Introduction 
 The United States government is fortunate that the Geneva Conventions do not apply 
to its war on tax shelters.1 Though its battles have produced many just victories, many 
unnecessary casualties have resulted from the government’s aggressive tactics.2 The 
federally-authorized tax practitioner privilege (the “FATP” privilege),3 codified in § 7525 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, has been a particularly unfortunate victim of the government’s 
zeal.4
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1 Then-IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams established this “war” metaphor in his emphatic “Remember the 
Alamo” speech.  See IRS Chief Counsel Speech on Privilege and Shelters, 2002 Tax Notes Today 110-29 (June 
7, 2002) (“I am here to tell you I do not plan to allow a repeat of those Texas tragedies in the battle against 
abusive tax avoidance transactions. I much prefer to emulate the example set by Sam Houston at the Battle of 
San Jacinto. Like General Houston and the Texans who delivered a crushing defeat to Santa Anna at San 
Jacinto, I believe that the IRS is poised to gain the upper hand in its assault against abusive transactions, 
equipped with the right weapons!”). 
2 See, e.g., William M. Sullivan Jr. and Kevin M. King, Striking Down The Thompson Memo:  New York Court 
Properly Finds Problems With Government Tactics, Legal Times, August 21, 2006 (“[Two recent rulings] hold 
that government interference with corporate decisions to advance legal fees to employees and government 
efforts to condition such fee advancements on employees’ participation in interviews with investigators are 
unconstitutional.  The rulings mark a significant setback for the Department of Justice.”).  See also Mondaq 
Business Briefing, Pressuring KPMG to Cut Off Advancement of Fees of Employees in Criminal Tax Shelter 
Investigation Violates Constitutional Rights, July 31, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 13200612. 
3 Section 7525 provides limited privilege protections for communications made to tax practitioners authorized 
to practice before the IRS.   “Federally authorized tax practitioners” include CPA’s, enrolled agents, and 
enrolled actuaries.  See 31 U.S.C. § 330 and 31 C.F.R. § 10.3.  Communications made to tax attorneys continue 
to be protected by the common-law attorney client privilege, which is generally broader than the FATP 
privilege.  See Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 
4 See generally Joel S. Newman, Tax Practice And Privilege:  A Tale Of Two Countries, 99 Tax Notes 422 
(Apr. 21, 2003) (“The IRS is at war against abusive tax shelters. In this atmosphere of swirling hostilities, the 
2Since Congress enacted § 7525 in 1998, the FATP privilege has been the subject of 
much controversy.  Though the statute purports to protect communications pertaining to tax 
advice between a client and his tax advisor (to the extent such communications would be 
considered privileged if they were between a taxpayer and an attorney),5 the privilege has 
been narrowly construed by both the courts and the IRS.6 In disputes over whether the 
privilege protects the identity of a taxpayer from disclosure,7 whether the privilege extends to 
tax practitioner work-product,8 or whether the privilege extends to nontax proceedings,9
taxpayers have achieved little success in asserting the privilege.  Indeed, the various 
exceptions to the privilege have left it with “more holes than swiss cheese.”10 
The federal courts’ rejection of the “selective waiver” doctrine could create yet 
another hole in the FATP privilege.  Though a voluntary disclosure to a third party ordinarily 
waives a testimonial privilege, the selective waiver doctrine allows a client to continue to 
assert the privilege if the earlier disclosure was made to the federal government.11 Section 
7525’s narrow scope makes a court’s acceptance of this doctrine critical to the privilege’s 
survival.12 
Unfortunately, the selective waiver doctrine has received a cool reception in the 
federal courts.  Most courts have summarily rejected it, with only one circuit court and a 
 
tax return preparer’s privilege is seen more as a battle trophy than as a fundamental freedom. It should not be 
surprising that it has been seriously eroded.”). 
5 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) 
6 See generally Danielle M. Smith and David L. Kleinman,  The Federally Authorized Tax Practitioner 
Privilege: What Remains Under §7525?, BNA Tax Management Weekly Report (May 22, 2006). 
7 See United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003). 
8 See United States v. KPMG, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002). 
9 See Chao v. Koresko, Slip Copy, 2005 WL 2521886 (3rd Cir. 2005) and Doe v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 
2d 627, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2003). 
10 Sheryl Stratton, Lawyers Discuss Postshelter Assault On Privilege, Tax Notes, p. 289 (Apr. 18, 2005) 
(quoting B. John Williams).  Section 7525’s key exceptions are statutory, though courts have riddled it with 
further requirements.  See infra III.B. 
11 See infra Part II.B.   
12 See infra Part IV.B. 
3spatter of district courts expressing approval.13 Courts have not specifically addressed the 
doctrine with respect to the FATP privilege, however, but have examined the doctrine only in 
the context of attorney-client privilege claims.  Nonetheless, because courts tend to define the 
FATP privilege by reference to the attorney-client privilege, it seems likely that the doctrine 
will receive another round of rejections.14 
This paper argues that a court should accept the selective-waiver doctrine with respect 
to the FATP privilege, notwithstanding any possible contrary jurisprudence on the attorney-
client privilege.  Part II briefly discusses the selective waiver doctrine, and outlines the 
reasons most commonly cited for its adoption or rejection.  Part III describes the FATP 
privilege and details the IRS’s and practitioners’ common assumption that the selective 
waiver doctrine will not apply to it. Part IV argues that § 7525’s text demands instead that the 
doctrine always apply to the privilege.  Part V examines statements in § 7525’s legislative 
history that may contradict this conclusion.   
Part II:  The Selective Waiver Doctrine 
A.  Background:  The Attorney Client Privilege 
The attorney client privilege is the oldest testimonial privilege for confidential 
communications known to the common law.15 Its purpose is to encourage full and frank 
communications between attorneys and their clients, and thereby promote broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.16 The Supreme Court has 
long recognized that privilege encourages clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.17 
13 See infra Part II.B.i. 
14 See infra Part IV.B. 
15 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 
1961)). 
16 449 U.S. at 389. 
17 Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)). 
4Though courts articulate the specific elements of the privilege differently, Wigmore 
summarizes the essential principles governing the privilege as follows: (1) Where legal 
advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) 
the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are 
at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 
(8) except where the protection is waived.18 
The common-law attorney client privilege is recognized in section 501 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  That Rule provides, in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or 
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, 
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of 
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States 
in the light of reason and experience. 
 
Tax-related communications between clients and their attorneys are governed under the same 
set of privilege principles as those that govern communications between attorneys and clients 
generally.  Thus, for example, the privilege extends only to tax communications that are legal 
in nature, such as those made to enable the preparation of a brief or opinion letter, and not to 
communications made to enable the preparation of a tax return.19 
Though communications between a client and her attorney are generally privileged, 
the client asserting the privilege must maintain the confidentiality of the communication.20 
For example, if the client voluntarily discloses otherwise privileged communications to a 
 
18 United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in 
Trials at Common Law § 2292 (John T. McNaughton rev., 1961)). 
19 United States v. Frederick, 182 F3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Communications from a client that neither 
reflect the lawyer’s thinking nor are made for the purpose of eliciting the lawyer’s professional advice or other 
legal assistance are not privileged. The information that a person furnishes the preparer of his tax return is 
furnished for the purpose of enabling the preparation of the return, not the preparation of a brief or an opinion 
letter. Such information therefore is not privileged.”). 
20 In re Matter of Cont’l Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1314 (7th Cir. 1984).  See also In re Keeper of the Records, 
348 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[T]he privilege evaporates the moment that confidentiality ceases to exist.”). 
5third party, the privilege will be deemed waived.21 The third-party disclosure does not vitiate 
the privilege per se, but instead is considered strong evidence that the client did not intend 
that the original communication be made in confidence.22 
The confidentiality requirement helps ensure that only communications that the client 
made in reliance on the privilege are protected from discovery.  If a client voluntarily repeats 
his communications to third parties, it is likely that the privilege’s underlying purpose—
encouraging full and frank discussions between attorneys and their clients—is no longer 
served.  Rather, if a client freely reveals his confidences to others, the privilege is 
superfluous—the client probably would have made the disclosures to the attorney 
irrespective of the privilege, and the privilege is unnecessary to protect the attorney-client 
relationship.23 
Where a disclosure is involuntary, however, the court will not deem the privilege 
waived.  Though it is not entirely clear what distinguishes a voluntary disclosure from an 
 
21 Courts have recognized small circles of third parties to whom confidential communications may be revealed 
without vitiating the privilege.  See United States vs. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F.3d 681, 684 
(1st Cir. 1997) (“ Even where the cases are limited to those involving a deliberate and voluntary disclosure of a 
privileged communication to someone other than the attorney or client, the case law is far from settled. But 
decisions do tend to mark out, although not with perfect consistency, a small circle of ‘others’ with whom 
information may be shared without loss of the privilege (e.g., secretaries, interpreters, counsel for a cooperating 
co-defendant, a parent present when a child consults a lawyer).”); U.S. v. Kovel 296 F.2d 918, 920 (2nd Cir. 
1961)  (“‘The assistance of these [secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet 
admitted to the bar, and aides of other sorts] being indispensable to his work and the communications of the 
client being often necessarily committed to them by the attorney or by the client himself, the privilege must 
include all the persons who act as the attorney’s agents.’ 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2301.”);  United States v. 
Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1467 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[The common interest doctrine] generally allows a defendant to 
assert the attorney-client privilege to protect his statements made in confidence not to his own lawyer, but to an 
attorney for a co-defendant for a common purpose related to the defense of both.’”) (citations omitted).  The 
selective waiver doctrine is concerned with disclosures made to persons outside of these special circles. 
22 See United States v. Bigos, 459 F.2d 639, 643 (1st Cir. 1972) (“While we agree that the presence of a third 
party commonly destroys the privilege, it does so only insofar as it is indicative of the intent of the parties that 
their communication not be confidential.”). 
23 Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an 
Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U Pa L Rev 1198, 1207 (1982).  See also Powers v. Chicago Transit 
Auth., 890 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of the attorney-client 
privilege is inconsistent with the attorney-client confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.”). 
6involuntary one, the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence do shed some light on the issue.24 
Proposed Rule 512 provides that an involuntary disclosure is one “compelled erroneously” or 
“made without opportunity to claim the privilege,” such as one made to an eavesdropper or 
one improperly made available from a computer bank.25 Not all courts have followed the 
Proposed Rules, however, as Congress’s failure to adopt them deprives them of any legal 
effect.26 
B.  Selective Waiver Doctrine:  Illustrative Cases 
 “The case law addressing the issue of [selective] waiver is in a state of ‘hopeless 
confusion.’”27 Though courts generally agree that a voluntary disclosure waives the attorney-
client privilege, some have taken different approaches when that disclosure is made to a 
government agency.  A few courts have concluded that such a disclosure results only in a 
“selective” or “limited” waiver, and that the client is free to assert the privilege against other 
litigants.28 Others have suggested that the privilege will be preserved if the disclosure was 
made pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, but have declined to adopt any per se rule.29 
24 Though the Rules are not authoritative, their approval “by the Supreme Court establishes that [they] constitute 
‘a convenient comprehensive guide to the federal law of privileges as it now stands.’” Transamerica Computer 
Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854, 857-
58 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J.)). For a discussion of the cases that have referred to Rule 512, see Hopson v. 
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 242 (D. Md. 2005). 
25 Proposed Fed R. Evid. 511, 51 F.R.D. 381 (1971), advisory committee note. 
26 For example, courts have not always followed the Proposed Rules’ conclusion that a disclosure “compelled 
erroneously” is involuntary.  See Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483-84 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing the 
various approaches courts have taken to “inadvertent disclosures”). 
27 In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 294-95 (6th Cir. 2002). 
28 This controversial approach has spawned much commentary.  See, e.g., Richard Marcus, The Perils of 
Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1605 (1986); Andrew J. McNally, Comment, Revitalizing 
Selective Waiver: Encouraging Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing by Restricting Third Party 
Access to Disclosed Materials, 35 Seton Hall L.Rev. 823, 828 (2005); Beth S. Dorris, Note, The Limited Waiver 
Rule: Creation of an SEC-Corporation Privilege, 36 Stan.L.Rev. 789 (1984);  Ashok M. Pinto, Cooperation 
and Self-Interest Are Strange Bedfellows: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege through Production 
of Privileged Documents in a Government Investigation, 106 W. Va. L. Rev. 359 (2004). 
29 See infra note 65. 
7Most courts, however, have held rigidly to the rule that any voluntary disclosure permanently 
waives the privilege.   
The cases discussed below illustrate the reasons most commonly cited for the 
selective waiver doctrine’s acceptance or rejection.  All deal with the doctrine in the context 
of attorney-client privilege claims.30 Though it is not certain that a court will follow its 
jurisprudence on that privilege when determining the scope of the FATP privilege, such an 
approach seems likely.31 Thus, it is useful to examine these cases before considering the 
doctrine’s application to § 7525. 
i.   Selective Waiver Doctrine Accepted 
In Diversified Industries v. Meredith,32 the Eighth Circuit explicitly adopted the 
selective waiver doctrine, holding that a disclosure to a government agency would not waive 
the client’s privilege vis-à-vis other litigants.    
The petitioner in the case, Diversified, engaged in the manufacturing and processing 
of metals,33 and sold such metals to numerous customers, including Weatherhead. In 1974 
and 1975, during proxy fight litigation involving Diversified, facts surfaced indicating that 
Diversified had established a “slush” fund to bribe purchasing agents of companies with 
whom Diversified dealt.34 Weatherhead, upon learning of these facts, filed a complaint 
against Diversified, alleging that the company’s employees had bribed Weatherhead’s 
purchasing agents, causing them to accept inferior metals in exchange for payments from the 
slush fund.     
 
30 These cases also devote considerable attention to the work-product doctrine.  Such issues are beyond the 
scope of this paper, and are omitted from discussion.  Whether FATPs receive work product remains an open 
question. 
31 See infra Parts III & IV. 
32 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
33 Id. at 607. 
34 Id.
8Weatherhead sought access to an internal report examining Diversified’s questionable 
business practices.  Diversified had hired an outside law firm to conduct an internal 
investigation of the company’s misconduct, and the law firm had prepared an extensive 
report detailing the findings of its investigations.  Though the report undoubtedly contained 
communications within the scope of the attorney-client privilege and would normally be 
protected from disclosure, Diversified had produced the report to the Securities & Exchange 
Commission pursuant to an administrative subpoena.  Weatherhead accordingly argued that 
Diversified had waived its privilege with respect to the report, as Diversified did not keep the 
communications contained in the report confidential.  Diversified countered that the 
disclosure of the report to the SEC did not operate to waive its privilege, and that the 
company could not be compelled to disclose the report to private litigants. 
On rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit found that the report was protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and concluded that the privilege had not been waived: 
We finally address the issue of whether Diversified waived its attorney-client 
privilege with respect to the privileged material by voluntarily surrendering it 
to the SEC pursuant to an agency subpoena. As Diversified disclosed these 
documents in a separate and nonpublic SEC investigation, we conclude that 
only a [selective] waiver of the privilege occurred. See Bucks County Bank 
and Trust Co. v. Storck, 297 F.Supp. 1122 (D.Haw.1969). Cf. United States v. 
Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds,368 U.S. 
14, 82 S.Ct. 127, 7 L.Ed.2d 75 (1961). To hold otherwise may have the effect 
of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent 
outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect 
stockholders, potential stockholders, and customers.35 
Though the Eighth Circuit’s opinion is short on analysis, its holding is clear:  a voluntary 
disclosure to a government agency in a nonpublic investigation will not result in waiver of 
 
35 Id. at 611. 
9the attorney-client privilege.  A few district courts have adopted similar approaches,36 but no 
circuit court has expressly embraced Diversified.
ii.  Selective Waiver Doctrine Rejected 
Several circuits have rejected the “selective waiver” doctrine, and have instead held 
that disclosure to the government waives the privilege in the same fashion as disclosure to 
any other third-party.  Though the courts acknowledge that the selective waiver doctrine 
encourages compliance with government investigations, they generally hold that this noble 
policy goal has little to do with the purposes of the attorney-client privilege.   
For example, in Permian Corp. v. United States,37 the D.C. Circuit completely 
rejected the selective waiver doctrine.  At issue in Permian were documents that Occidental 
Petroleum (Permian’s parent) had provided to the SEC regarding the legality of Permian’s 
pricing practices for crude oil.38 Occidental (pursuant to a confidentiality agreement) 
disclosed the documents to the SEC, seeking a favorable ruling from the agency regarding a 
pending transaction.39 
Later, the Department of Energy wished to investigate whether Occidental had 
violated certain federal energy laws and tried to obtain the documents, notwithstanding the 
company’s privilege claim.  The Department argued that Occidental had waived its privilege 
by producing the documents to the SEC, irrespective of the confidentiality agreement.   
 
36 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F.Supp. 368, 373 (D.Wis.1979) (“I believe that such 
cooperation [with the government] should be encouraged, and therefore I will not treat the release of the 
Quarles & Brady report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Internal Revenue Service, or the New 
York grand jury as a waiver of the corporation's attorney-client privilege with regard to the notes.”);  Saito v. 
McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ. A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002), aff’d 870 A.2d 
1192 (Del. 2005). 
37 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
38 Id. at 1217. 
39 Id. at 1218.   
10
The D.C. Circuit agreed, concluding that Occidental had waived whatever testimonial 
privileges may have attached to the documents by disclosing them to the SEC, finding the 
selective waiver theory “wholly unpersuasive.”40 The court noted that a voluntary disclosure 
is necessarily inconsistent with the attorney-client privilege’s confidentiality requirement:   
[W]e cannot see how the availability of a “[selective] waiver” would serve the 
interests underlying the common law privilege for confidential 
communications between attorney and client…The privilege depends on the 
assumption that full and frank communication will be fostered by the 
assurance of confidentiality, and the justification for granting the privilege 
‘ceases when the client does not appear to have been desirous of secrecy.’ 8 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence s 2311, at 599 (McNaughton rev. 1961).  The Eighth 
Circuit's “[selective] waiver” rule has little to do with this confidential link 
between the client and his legal advisor.  Voluntary cooperation with 
government investigations may be a laudable activity, but it is hard to 
understand how such conduct improves the attorney-client relationship. If the 
client feels the need to keep his communications with his attorney 
confidential, he is free to do so under the traditional rule by consistently 
asserting the privilege, even when the discovery request comes from a 
“friendly” agency.41 
The court then suggested that the “selective waiver” doctrine was inherently unfair to third-
party litigants:   
The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, 
waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to 
obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose 
confidentiality he has already compromised for his own benefit...The attorney-
client privilege is not designed for such tactical employment.42 
The court refused to allow Occidental to use the attorney-client privilege as both a sword and 
a shield.  Occidental had disclosed privileged documents to the SEC in order to obtain a 
favorable ruling from the agency, but then wished to assert the attorney-client privilege 
against the Department of Energy in order to prevent that agency from discovering evidence 
 
40 Id. at 1220.   
41 Id.  at 1220-1221. 
42 Id.  at 1221. 
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of the company’s wrongdoing.  The D.C. Circuit, observing the inherent inequity of such 
“tactical employment,” rejected the selective waiver doctrine altogether. 
 Others have followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead.  In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Republic of Philippines,43 the Third Circuit analyzed the “celebrated and controversial 
selective waiver theory.”44 The petitioner, Westinghouse, had allegedly obtained 
construction contracts by bribing foreign officials. Westinghouse retained the law firm 
Kirkland & Ellis to conduct an internal investigation into whether company officials had in 
fact made improper payments.45 In the course of the internal investigation, Kirkland & Ellis 
produced two reports of its findings, and, at the behest of Westinghouse, showed SEC 
investigators one of the reports.  The law firm also orally presented its findings to the SEC, 
but did not supply the agency with any of the documents underlying the presentation or the 
report.46 
The Republic of Philippines, in a civil suit against Westinghouse, sought access to the 
documents shown to the SEC.  The Republic alleged that Westinghouse obtained a large 
power plant contract in the Philippines by bribing a henchman of former President Ferdinand 
Marcos, and believed that the documents were relevant to its complaint.47 The Republic 
argued that whatever privileges may have attached to the documents were effectively waived 
by Westinghouse’s disclosures to the SEC.  Westinghouse objected, invoking the attorney-
client privilege.48 
43 951 F.2d 1414 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
44 Id. at 1423. 
45 Id. at 1418. 
46 Id. at 1418. 
47 Id. at 1417. 
48 Id. at 1420. 
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The Third Circuit determined that Westinghouse had in fact waived its privilege by 
showing the documents to the SEC, agreeing in part with the D.C. Circuit: 
We find the first part of the D.C. Circuit's reasoning persuasive. The Eighth 
Circuit's sole justification for permitting selective waiver was to encourage 
corporations to undertake internal investigations…[S]elective waiver does not 
serve the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one’s attorney in order to 
obtain informed legal assistance; it merely encourages voluntary disclosure to 
government agencies, thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended 
purpose.49 
The court also agreed with one commentator who suggested that the privilege is superfluous 
when a client voluntarily reveals communications to a third-party: 
If clients themselves divulge such information to third parties, chances are that 
they would also have divulged it to their attorneys, even without the 
protection of the privilege. Thus, once a client has revealed privileged 
information to a third party, the basic justification for the privilege no longer 
applies…50 
The Third Circuit did not, however, adopt the portion of the Permian opinion relating to the 
alleged “unfairness” of the selective waiver doctrine, concluding that the resolution of that 
issue was unnecessary to its holding.51 
The First Circuit in United States v. MIT52 also rejected the selective waiver doctrine, 
but provided an unusual interpretation of the “voluntary disclosure” requirement.  The 
respondent in the case, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (a § 501(c)(3) 
organization), had engaged in contract work with the Department of Defense.  Pursuant to the 
Department’s standard contract review procedures, MIT had disclosed certain law firm 
 
49 Id. at 1425. 
50 Id. at 1424 (quoting Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U Pa L Rev 1198, 1207 (1982). 
51 Id. at 1426 (“Our rejection of the selective waiver rule does not depend, however, on the second reason the 
D.C. Circuit gave in Permian for rejecting Diversified. Generally, the "fairness doctrine" is invoked in partial 
(as opposed to selective) disclosure cases. This case involves selective, rather than partial, disclosure. The 
courts and commentators disagree about whether there is anything unfair about selective disclosure. Here is it 
unnecessary to decide the question.”). 
52 129 F.3d 681(1st Cir. 1997). 
13
billing statements to the Defense Contract Audit Agency (“DCCA), the Department’s 
auditing arm.53 
In 1993, the Internal Revenue Service conducted an examination of MIT’s records to 
determine whether the university still qualified for tax-exempt status and to determine 
whether it was complying with other requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Code.54 
To aid its examination, the IRS requested from MIT copies of the billing statements of law 
firms that had represented MIT.   MIT supplied the documents requested but redacted 
information claimed to be covered by the attorney-client privilege.55 The IRS then sought 
the documents from the DCAA, to which the MIT had previously disclosed the statements 
without redaction.  
The DCCA refused to turn over the documents to the IRS without MIT’s consent, 
which MIT refused to give, citing the attorney-client privilege.56 The IRS then served an 
administrative summons on MIT, seeking production of the documents.  MIT’s refusal to 
comply with that summons led the parties to court. 
After considering the parties’ arguments, the First Circuit rejected MIT’s privilege 
claim, concluding that the university’s disclosure to the DCCA effectively waived its 
privilege with respect to the billing statements.  As the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit did 
earlier, the First Circuit expressed skepticism that the selective waiver doctrine did anything 
to further the purposes of the attorney-client privilege: 
MIT, like any client, continues to control both the nature of its communications 
with counsel and the ultimate decision whether to disclose such 
communications to third parties. The only constraint imposed by the traditional 
rule here invoked by the government--that disclosure to a third party waives the 
 
53 Id. at 683. 
54 Id. at 682. 
55 Id. at 683. 
56 Id. at 685 
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privilege--is to limit selective disclosure, that is, the provision of otherwise 
privileged communications to one outsider while withholding them from 
another. MIT has provided no evidence that respecting this constraint will 
prevent it or anyone else from getting adequate legal advice.57 
MIT also argued that its disclosures to DCCA were involuntary, and thus could not 
operate to waive its privilege claim.  The court expressed doubt that MIT’s disclosures were 
in fact compelled by law,58 but concluded that even if they were, MIT voluntarily placed 
itself in a position to disclose:   
MIT further argues that the disclosure to the audit agency was not “voluntary” 
because of the practical pressures and the legal constraints to which it was 
subject as a government contractor. The extent of those pressures and 
constraints is far from clear, but assuming arguendo that they existed, MIT 
chose to place itself in this position by becoming a government contractor. In 
short, MIT’s disclosure to the audit agency resulted from its own voluntary 
choice, even if that choice was made at the time it became a defense 
contractor and subjected itself to the alleged obligation of disclosure.59 
Thus, under the First Circuit’s view, MIT’s disclosures were deemed “voluntary,” even if 
such disclosures were compelled by a statute or regulation, as it had voluntarily accepted 
defense contracts.   
This definition of “voluntary disclosure” is different from that found elsewhere in the 
case law.  Courts usually examine whether the actual act of disclosure was voluntary, rather 
than whether the client voluntarily placed himself in a position to disclose.60 In any event, 
MIT added to the litany of cases rejecting the selective waiver doctrine. 
 
57 Id. at 685 (emphasis supplied). 
58 Id. at 686 n.5 (“MIT’s main citation for its duty to disclose is not to a statute or regulation but to a procedures 
manual maintained by the audit agency. There is no actual evidence that MIT would have been denied payment 
if it had sought to negotiate some lesser disclosure.”). 
59 Id. at 686.  (citations omitted, emphasis supplied).   
60 See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978) (“It is our belief that 
under the specific circumstances of the accelerated discovery proceedings in the CDC litigation, IBM’s 
inadvertent production there of some privileged documents does not constitute a waiver of the privilege 
protecting the production of those documents, for that production was [made involuntarily].’”).  The Ninth 
Circuit examined the circumstances surrounding the actual disclosure when determining whether the disclosure 
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iii.  Summary 
The selective waiver doctrine has not gained much traction in the federal courts, to 
put it mildly.  In addition to the rejections by the D.C. Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the First 
Circuit (discussed above), the selective waiver doctrine has been expressly rejected by the 
Federal Circuit,61 the Fourth Circuit,62 the Sixth Circuit,63 and the Tenth Circuit.64 Only the 
Eighth Circuit has accepted the doctrine, and even then, it did so without much analysis.  
Though a few circuits have refused to accept a per se rule regarding selective waiver, their 
ultimate views on the doctrine are far from clear.65 
The judiciary’s hostility to the selective waiver doctrine is not surprising.  Courts 
have long held that the attorney-client privilege is in derogation of the search for truth, and 
must therefore be construed narrowly.66 And, although approaches vary somewhat, courts 
generally require that the client guard the confidential communications closely—even an 
 
was voluntary.  It did not examine, for example, whether IBM’s decision to engage in the computer business—
and thereby subject itself to lawsuits from competitors—was voluntary.  
61 Genentech, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission, 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
62 In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988). 
63 In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 299 (6th Cir. 2002) 
64 In re Qwest Communications Int’l, Inc., 450 F3d 1179 (10th Cir. June 19, 2006). 
65 See Dellwood Farms v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122 (7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a confidentiality 
agreement may preserve privilege);  United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 1995) (“If there were 
ever an argument for limited waiver, it might well depend importantly on just what had been disclosed to the 
government and on what understandings. Without intending to preclude such an argument in a future case, we 
think that it is enough in this one to say that no such claim of limited waiver has been argued to us.”);  Salomon 
Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P. (In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2nd Cir. 
1993) (suggesting that privilege may be preserved when party enters into confidentiality agreement with 
government);  Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although we do not decide the case 
under the express waiver doctrine, we note that the law in this area is not as settled as the state would have us 
believe.”). These uncommitted statements provide little comfort to clients.  As the Supreme Court observed, 
“[a]n uncertain privilege…is little better than no privilege at all.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
66 Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 144 (2003) (“We have often recognized that statutes establishing 
evidentiary privileges must be construed narrowly because privileges impede the search for the truth.”); 
In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Weger,
709 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.1983)); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 631-32 (9th Cir.1960); United States v. 
Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 562-63 (5th Cir.1976)). 
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inadvertent disclosure will waive the privilege in some jurisdictions.67 It is thus hardly 
unusual that a reviewing court will deem the privilege waived whenever a party makes a 
third-party disclosure, irrespective of the third party’s identity.68 
III.  Selective Waiver and the § 7525 privilege 
A. Background  
As part of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,69 Congress created a right 
to privileged communications between taxpayers and their advisors.  No comparable 
privilege had previously existed under federal law.70 Pursuant to § 3411(a) of the Act, 
Congress added § 7525 to the Internal Revenue Code.71 Section 7525(a)(1) ) provides: 
 
67 See Timothy Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 59, 116-118, nn.252-255 (2002) ((“A few 
courts have suggested that waiver occurs regardless of the circumstances of the disclosure, including situations 
in which no blame can be attached to either the attorney or the client.”) (citing In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 
980 (D.C. Cir. 1989)  (stating that clients seeking to preserve the privilege must treat the communications “like 
jewels” and that, short of court-compelled disclosure or other extraordinary circumstances, the court will not 
engage in an analysis of degrees of voluntariness))). 
68 See infra note 21 for the limited exceptions to this rule.   
69 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (July 22, 1998) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
70 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).   
71 Section 7525, in full, provides: 
Sec. 7525.  Confidentiality privileges relating to taxpayer communications.  
(a) Uniform application to taxpayer communications with federally authorized practitioners. 
 (1) General rule. With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality which apply 
to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a communication between a taxpayer 
and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent the communication would be considered a privileged 
communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney. 
 (2) Limitations. Paragraph (1) may only be asserted in-- 
 (A) any noncriminal tax matter before the Internal Revenue Service; and 
 (B) any noncriminal tax proceeding in Federal court brought by or against the United States. 
 (3) Definitions. For purposes of this subsection-- 
 (A) Federally authorized tax practitioner. The term "federally authorized tax practitioner" means any 
individual who is authorized under Federal law to practice before the Internal Revenue Service if such practice 
is subject to Federal regulation under section 330 of title 31, United States Code. 
 (B) Tax advice. The term "tax advice" means advice given by an individual with respect to a matter which is 
within the scope of the individual's authority to practice described in subparagraph (A). 
(b) Section not to apply to communications regarding tax shelters. The privilege under subsection (a) shall not 
apply to any written communication which is-- 
 (1) between a federally authorized tax practitioner and-- 
 (A) any person, 
 (B) any director, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the person, or 
 (C) any other person holding a capital or profits interest in the person, and 
 (2) in connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of the person in any tax shelter (as 
defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii). 
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With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of 
confidentiality which apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an 
attorney shall also apply to a communication between a taxpayer and any 
federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent the communication would be 
considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an 
attorney.  
 
Though § 7525’s general rule purports to provide uniform evidentiary rules relating to 
communications between taxpayers and their tax advisors, the statute does not completely 
harmonize the treatment of those communications.  Rather, while communications made to 
tax attorneys continue to be governed by the general rules relating to the attorney-client 
privilege, communications made to other tax advisors are subject to § 7525’s several 
exceptions. For example, Congress provided that the FATP privilege may be asserted only in 
1) noncriminal tax matters before the IRS and in 2) noncriminal tax proceedings in Federal 
court brought by or against the United States.72 Further, Congress limited the scope of the 
privilege by providing that it would not to apply to certain communications regarding tax 
shelters.73 Lastly, although the attorney-client privilege generally shields communications 
whenever legal advice of any kind is sought, § 7525 protects only those communications 
pertaining to tax advice.74 As the IRS acknowledges: 
Although [§  7525] is partly defined by reference to, and is no broader than, 
the attorney-client privilege, it is clearly a different privilege, created solely 
by statute, and defined as much by the statutory language as by reference to 
the common law attorney-client privilege.75 
Principles governing the attorney-client client privilege are obviously relevant to 
determining § 7525’s scope.  For example, as with the attorney-client privilege, the FATP 
 
72 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2). 
73 I.R.C. § 7525(b). 
74 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1). 
75 IRM 4.11.55.2.3. 
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privilege does not protect communications made in the furtherance of a crime.76 However, 
the FATP privilege is ultimately a product of statute, and is governed by Congressional intent 
much more so than by the “reason and experience”77 of the federal judiciary.  
 Nonetheless, the IRS and the courts have drawn heavily on attorney-client privilege 
principles when defining the scope of § 7525.  For example, in United States v. BDO 
Seidman,78 the Seventh Circuit addressed whether the § 7525 privilege can protect a 
taxpayer’s identity from disclosure.  The unnamed intervenors in the litigation (“the Does”) 
sought to prevent the IRS from enforcing an administrative summons compelling BDO to 
disclose certain documents which would presumably reveal the Does’ identities.  In 
determining whether such an “identity” privilege existed under § 7525, the court 
acknowledged the link between the attorney-client privilege and the FATP privilege: 
Because the scope of the tax practitioner-client privilege depends on the scope 
of the common law protections of confidential attorney-client 
communications, we must look to the body of common law interpreting the 
attorney-client privilege to interpret the § 7525 privilege. 
 
The court then emphasized that a party who asserts the § 7525 privilege must bear the same 
burdens that a party asserting the attorney-client privilege must bear: 
The mere assertion of a privilege is not enough; instead, a party that seeks to 
invoke the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing all of its 
essential elements.  A party that seeks to assert a § 7525 privilege bears the 
same burden. Among the essential elements of the attorney client privilege are 
the requirements that the communication be made to the attorney in 
confidence, and that the confidences constitute information that is not 
intended to be disclosed by the attorney...the privilege protects only the 
client’s confidences, not things which, at the time, are not intended to be held 
in the breast of the lawyer.79 
76 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1). 
77 Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 
78 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003). 
79 BDO, 337 F.3d at 811 (citations, quotations, and punctuation omitted). 
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The court went on to conclude that, while an identity privilege exists under both the attorney-
client privilege and the FATP privilege, the Does had not established that confidential 
communications would be disclosed if their identities were revealed to the IRS.  
Accordingly, the court denied the Does’ motion for intervention.  
 Others have similarly emphasized attorney-client privilege principles when 
examining the scope of the FATP privilege.   In U.S. v. KPMG, for example, the District 
Court for the District of Columbia observed that it “must [follow] the text of § 7525…[and 
address] any claims of § 7525 privilege in the same manner as it does for the attorney-client 
privilege.”80 Similarly, the IRS has ruled that the FATP privilege must be defined by 
reference to the attorney-client privilege.81 The author of the leading treatise on tax 
procedure writes, “the [§ 7525] privilege is coextensive with the attorney-client privilege, 
[and] the same limitations that apply to the attorney-client privilege apply to the 
accountant/enrolled agent privilege.”82 The courts and others have not defined the FATP 
privilege in part by reference to the attorney-client privilege, but seemed to have adopted that 
privilege’s principles in toto. This approach could very well sound the privilege’s death 
knell. 
B.  Selective Waiver and § 7525:  Current Views 
The selective waiver doctrine is on life support.  The courts have proven very hostile 
to the doctrine, having rejected it numerous times in the context of attorney-client privilege 
 
80 United States v.KPMG, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002).  See also Cavallaro v. U.S.  284 F.3d 236, 246 
(1st Cir. 2002) (“The parties to this litigation recognize…that accountant-client communications are privileged 
if they meet the traditional requirements of the attorney-client privilege.”). 
81 See 2000 IRS NSAR 11040 (“In this case, whether the relationship is accountant client or attorney client, we 
believe the same general principles will apply to the issue whether the document is protected.”), discussed infra 
Part III. 
82 Michael Saltzman, I.R.S. Practice and Procedure, § 13.11[4] (2nd ed. Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1991) 
(2005 update). 
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claims.83 Given this hostility, the IRS and commentators have readily concluded that the 
doctrine will not apply to the FATP privilege, either.   
For example, commentators have observed that parallel proceedings by the 
government may lead to a waiver of the FATP privilege.84 Though a taxpayer may try to 
assert the FATP privilege against each of the several agencies investigating him, the privilege 
is available only against the IRS.85 Thus, if the SEC wishes to examine the taxpayer’s 
communications with his tax advisor for possible violations of the securities laws, the 
taxpayer will not be able to seek shelter under § 7525, and will have to disclose those 
communications.  That disclosure would then cause the privilege to be deemed waived vis-a-
vis the IRS—presumably, the selective waiver doctrine does not apply.  As Barbara Kaplan 
of Greenberg Traurig writes, 
The [§  7525] privilege does not apply with respect to any regulatory body 
other than the IRS, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, if 
an otherwise privileged communication between an authorized practitioner 
and the taxpayer were disclosed to the SEC, the common law doctrine of 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege by disclosure would apply and the 
communication would lose its section 7525 protection.86 
The statement of one senior IRS official echoes this conclusion.87 
Commentators have also observed that because the § 7525 privilege is available only 
in noncriminal tax proceedings, the IRS can easily obtain otherwise privileged 
 
83 See infra Part II.B. 
84 Parallel proceedings involve the simultaneous investigations of multiple agencies into a taxpayer’s affairs, or 
the simultaneous investigations by both the Criminal and Civil Divisions of the IRS. 
85 Technically speaking, the privilege is not available against only the IRS, but may be asserted against (for 
example) the Department of Justice in a noncriminal tax proceeding.  See I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2).  For simplicity’s 
sake, this paper will refer to the IRS as the only party to which the privilege may be asserted against.   
86 Practising Law Institute PLI Order No. 6357 October-November, 2005 Tax Strategies for Corporate 
Acquisitions, Dispositions, Spin-Offs, Joint Ventures, Financings, Reorganizations & Restructurings 2005. 
87 See Sheryl Stratton, Accountant-Client Privilege Proposal Sliced and Diced, 98 Tax Notes Today 103-1 
(1998) (“The IRS’s [Associate Chief Counsel, Procedure & Administration, Deborah Butler] agreed. ‘If you are 
practicing in the Tax Court, for privilege waiver purposes, once something is disclosed, it is waived for all 
purposes.’ She cited a judge’s ruling that ‘once the bell has been rung, it is rung for all purposes.’ The 
information can be disclosed in many other contexts where the privilege does not apply, like in SEC or in 
criminal investigations, she said.”). 
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communications by instituting a criminal investigation against the taxpayer.  As one 
practitioner warns, 
[A]ccounting firms should be aware that the relevant consideration 
isn’t that a civil audit is not the subject of a criminal case today. The 
crucial factor is whether the audit ever becomes the subject of a 
criminal investigation, at which time the privilege evaporates 
retroactively.88 
Another practitioner expresses disbelief at such a construction of the statute, but concludes 
that § 7525’s restrictive wording may very well mandate waiver in these circumstances: 
[T]here [c]ould be a “retroactive loss” of the privilege. It is almost as if 
the privilege exists pursuant to statute but it cannot be “asserted” 
pursuant to the statute. While a first reaction is this could not be what 
was intended--to give with one hand and take away with the other--one 
must acknowledge the restrictive wording of the statute…Thus, a 
client’s previously believed confidences with his certified public 
accountant or enrolled agent representative could be used as evidence 
first to prosecute the client and perhaps even later in the post criminal 
civil audit review.89 
Again, it appears that the selective waiver doctrine will not apply to the FATP privilege. 
Though the Service has not issued any formal rule regarding the selective waiver 
doctrine, at least one piece of agency guidance rejects it.  In NSAR 11040, the IRS sought an 
opinion letter provided to the taxpayer by attorneys associated with an accounting firm.  The 
 
88 Sheryl Stratton, Lawyers Discuss Postshelter Assault On Privilege, Tax Notes, p. 289 (Apr. 18, 2005) 
(quoting David Aughtry). 
89 Theodore A. Sinars and Richard L. Manning, 15 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax’n § 55A:88 (emphasis 
supplied).  See also Michael Wilson, Note, Careful what you Wish For: The Tax Practitioner-Client Privilege 
Established by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 319, 340 
(“However, if the tax practitioner-client privilege is destroyed when a civil tax matter becomes a criminal tax 
matter, the door is opened to potential abuse by the IRS. In the experience of Regina J. Schroder, Chair of the 
Executive Committee of the Taxation Section of the State Bar of California, ‘a taxpayer’s accountant and other 
non-lawyer advisors are often subpoenaed as witnesses in a criminal Federal tax proceeding.’ Because of this 
fact, the IRS could attempt to circumvent the tax practitioner-client privilege by using any strained reasoning to 
turn civil tax matters into criminal tax matters in order to obtain discovery of formerly privileged 
communications between taxpayers and their non-attorney tax practitioners.”).  The IRS certainly did not 
welcome the enactment of the FATP privilege with open arms, perhaps suggesting that it will not hesitate to 
vitiate it.  See Alyson Petroni, Note, Unpacking the Accountant-Client Privilege Under I.R.C. Section 7525, 18 
Va. Tax Rev. 843, 847-851 (1999) (detailing the Treasury’s and the Service’s hostility to the privilege’s 
enactment). 
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taxpayer had previously provided the State Attorney General’s office with a copy of the letter 
in connection with a restructuring of the taxpayer’s business entities, but nonetheless asserted 
the attorney-client privilege with respect to the opinion letter.    
Before determining whether the any privileges had been waived, the IRS observed 
that, because the opinion letter was ultimately provided by an accounting firm, the attorney-
client privilege might be unavailable.  Rather, § 7525 would provide any available 
protections.  However, after reviewing the statute’s legislative history, the IRS decided that 
the same principles that govern the attorney-client privilege should govern the FATP 
privilege: 
In this case, whether the relationship is accountant client or attorney client, we 
believe the same general principles will apply to the issue whether the 
document is protected. 
The [FATP privilege] applies only to the extent that communications would 
be privileged if they were between a taxpayer and attorney. The privilege does 
not apply to any communication between an accountant and client if the 
communication would not have been privileged between an attorney and the 
client. S. Rep. No. 105-174. The privilege between the client and accountant 
can be waived in the same manner as the attorney client privilege.  If the 
taxpayer discloses to a third party the substance of a communication protected 
by the privilege, the privilege for that communication and any related 
communications is considered to be waived to the same extent and in the same 
manner as the privilege would be waived if the disclosure related to an 
attorney client communication. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-599.90 
Having decided that the taxpayer’s privilege claim must be examined under the 
principles governing the attorney-client privilege, the IRS concluded that the taxpayer had 
waived whatever testimonial privileges may have attached to the opinion letter by disclosing 
it to the State Attorney General’s office.  The IRS acknowledged the circuit split surrounding 
the selective waiver doctrine, but followed the majority rule that a voluntary disclosure of 
 
90 IRS NSAR 11,040 (2000). 
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privileged communications to a third party necessarily vitiates the privilege, even if that third 
party is a government agency.   
 The IRS and practitioners commonly assume that the selective waiver doctrine will 
not apply to the FATP privilege.  They have not specifically considered whether this result 
comports with the text of the statute, but instead presume that the FATP privilege may be 
waived in the same manner as the attorney-client privilege.  However, a more careful 
analysis of the statute’s text and the policies surrounding the selective waiver doctrine may 
lead one to the opposite conclusion. 
Part IV:  Selective Waiver Doctrine Should Apply to § 7525 
 Before examining the application of the selective waiver doctrine to the FATP 
privilege, a quick review of the courts’ approach to the doctrine in the context of the 
attorney-client privilege is in order: 
1. Courts are generally hesitant to accept the selective waiver doctrine, but at least 
one circuit (and a spatter of district courts) has adopted it, citing public policy. 
2. Courts that reject the doctrine will acknowledge the strong public policy 
arguments in favor of its acceptance, but 
i. are uncomfortable with the prospect that the client can assert the 
privilege as a litigation tactic, and thereby treat similarly situated 
opponents in litigation differently. 
ii. find acceptance of the doctrine unrelated to the purposes of the 
attorney client privilege.  Specifically, courts do not believe that 
acceptance of the selective waiver doctrine does anything to 
encourage full and frank communications between clients and their 
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attorneys, and is fundamentally inconsistent with the privilege’s 
confidentiality requirement. 
Though these counterarguments to the selective waiver doctrine are quite forceful in the 
context of the attorney-client privilege, they are inapplicable to the FATP privilege.  
A.  Traditional arguments for rejecting selective waiver are inapplicable to the § 7525
privilege 
 The courts’ usual counterarguments to the selective waiver doctrine are easily 
dismissed when a § 7525 privilege claim is at issue.  Congress severely limited the scope of 
the privilege by allowing its assertion only in noncriminal tax proceedings, and then only 
against the United States.  This narrow scope renders the traditional arguments against the 
selective waiver doctrine inapplicable. 
i.  Gamesmanship 
The courts have cautioned that acceptance of the selective waiver doctrine may allow 
a client to “pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and 
resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others.”91 Such gamesmanship threatens 
the legitimacy of the judicial system as a whole.92 When an attorney-client privilege claim is 
at issue, a private party may be understandably upset when she is barred from access to 
materials that her adversary has already made available to a government agency.93 
91 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221. 
92 See Comment, Developments In The Law:  Privileged Communication, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1629, 1646 (1985) 
(“[A] judicial system that ignores publicly known information or information known to an adversary risks 
losing its legitimacy as a truth-seeking process.”). 
93 Consider this hypothetical provided by one commentator:  Imagine you have a chronic illness and are 
admitted to the hospital multiple times….Subsequently, you hear that the hospital miscoded your admissions; 
therefore, you overpaid the hospital a substantial amount of money, and you decide to sue the hospital. During 
discovery, you learn the hospital also overcharged the government by miscoding Medicare claims. In fact, the 
hospital’s miscoding was so egregious that the hospital paid the Department of Justice (DOJ) $ 840 million in a 
settlement deal. The evidence, primarily internal audits, used to indict the hospital was then given to the DOJ as 
part of the settlement deal. However, the hospital will not let anyone else see the results of the audits, which is 
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Such concerns, however, are not relevant to the FATP privilege—the client asserting 
this privilege will not be able to engage in any such gamesmanship.  Because the privilege is 
available only in noncriminal tax proceedings to which the United States is a party, the client 
cannot possibly choose to disclose materials to some adversaries and not to others.   
Absolutely no accountant-client privilege is recognized by the federal common law,94 and 
private parties and government agencies can freely discover communications made between 
a client and his nonattorney tax advisor.  No third party is adversely affected by a client’s 
ability to assert the FATP privilege against the United States in noncriminal tax proceedings.   
 In some sense, the client is able “to discriminate between parties who are roughly on 
the same footing.”95 The client may, for example, reveal tax-related communications to the  
SEC during a securities-related investigation.  If the client is allowed to continue to assert the 
privilege against the IRS, the agency is discriminated against vis-à-vis the SEC.   This 
“discrimination,” however, is hardly cause for alarm, but is instead the entire point of the 
privilege. Congress clearly anticipated that the IRS would be discriminated against when it 
provided that the privilege would apply only in noncriminal tax proceedings.  Any such 
discrimination is not attributable to the client’s “gamesmanship,” but to unambiguously 
expressed Congressional intent.96 
ii.  Confidentiality 
the proof needed to substantiate your claim against  the hospital. The hospital maintains that the audit 
information does not have to be released to you or any other party because it is confidential information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. The hospital claims that the fact that the 
DOJ got to see this ‘confidential information’ is irrelevant. Is this fair?  Jody E. Okrzesik, Note, Selective 
Waiver: Should the Government be Privy to Privileged Information Without Waiving the Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine?, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 115, 116-117 (2003). 
94 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).   
95 Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 310. 
96 See I.R.C. § 7525.  Note that the “intent” referred to in this paper is an “objectified” intent, rather than the 
“subjective” intent of the legislators.  See infra note 127. 
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Because the attorney-client privilege is designed to protect only those 
communications made in reliance on the privilege, the courts have insisted that the client 
maintain the confidentiality of her communications with her attorney.97 If a client reveals 
those communications to a third party, the natural inference is that her original statements 
were not “made in confidence,” and that she would have made the statements regardless of 
the privilege.  The courts have observed that the selective waiver doctrine is fundamentally 
inconsistent with this confidentiality requirement, and does nothing to encourage full and 
frank communications between clients and their attorneys.  
 The FATP privilege is quite different from the attorney-client privilege, however, and 
serves different purposes.98 In order to further these purposes, one must consider the unique 
scope of the privilege.   It does not make sense to adopt attorney-client privilege principles in 
toto when determining the scope of the FATP privilege.   In fact, strictly applying such 
principles leads to several contradictions. 
Consider, for example, the application of the attorney-client privilege’s “legal advice” 
requirement to the FATP privilege.  Under attorney-client privilege principles, 
communications between taxpayers and their advisors are privileged only where the client 
seeks legal advice.  However, the practitioners covered by § 7525 are not licensed to practice 
law, and therefore cannot dispense legal advice.  Thus, if the § 7525 privilege carries a “legal 
advice” requirement, taxpayers can never assert the privilege, as they will be unable to show 
that they have sought legal advice from their nonattorney advisor.  Congress could not 
possibly have intended this absurd result, and the statute’s language—that the privilege 
applies only “to the extent the communication would be considered a privileged 
 
97 See supra Part II. 
98 The privilege serves the limited purpose of providing confidentiality protections for tax-related 
communications in noncriminal tax matters, subject to some exceptions.  See I.R.C. § 7525. 
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communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney”—must not be read literally.99 
Under a textual approach, such literal interpretations are disfavored, particularly when they 
produce such silly results.100 
Indeed, courts have not imposed a “legal advice” requirement on the FATP 
privilege,101 but they have insisted that the attorney-client privilege’s confidentiality 
requirement does apply.102 Such insistence is misguided, however.  Though the attorney-
client privilege is a broad privilege, available during legal proceedings of any kind, and 
against virtually all adversaries, the FATP privilege is available only in noncriminal tax 
 
99 See also Robert T. Smith, After the Alamo: Taxpayer Claims of Privilege and the IRS War on Tax Shelters,
Tax Notes, Jan. 13, 2003 (“[T]his view has the potential for turning the entire section 7525 privilege on its head 
because nonattorney tax practitioners are not permitted to provide legal advice. Even attorneys working for 
accounting firms have traditionally not been able to render legal services lest the firm be engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law. Thus, to the extent the tax practitioner privilege applies only to tax advice that 
would be considered legal advice if provided by a lawyer, serious questions remain.”) 
100 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.  490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We are 
confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, 
result. Our task is to give some alternative meaning…that avoids this consequence.”).  See also Pub. Citizen v. 
United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) and Smith v. United States, 
508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is…a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, 
indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn 
from the context in which it is used.’”) (citations omitted).  Though critics of textualism sometimes confuse it 
with literalism, it is worth emphasizing that the two approaches to statutory interpretation are quite different.  
See, e.g. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 696 (1997) 
(“Textualism is not literalism. Not even the most committed textualist would claim that statutory texts are 
inherently ‘plain on their face,’ or that all interpretation takes place within the four corners of the Statutes at 
Large.”);  Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1023, 
1028 (1998) (“Textualists agree that textualism should not be confused with literalism. Textualism is not 
‘wooden’; it recognizes that consulting context is part of the interpretive process.”);  Robert A. Kearney, The 
Coming Rise of Disparate Impact Theory, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 69, 109 (2005) (“Textualism is not the same as 
literalism, which, though generally useful as a mode of statutory interpretation and true to Congress’ chosen 
words, is also capable of producing strange--if not ‘[p]erverse and absurd’-- statutory interpretations.);  Daniel 
J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures:  A Study Of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 887, 894 
(2000) (“Scalia’s textualism is not simply philistine literalism, but Scalia’s rhetoric defending textualism does 
invite its caricature as such.”). 
101 But see United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Nothing in the new statute suggests 
that these nonlawyer practitioners are entitled to privilege when they are doing other than lawyers’ work.”).  
The statement in Frederick is dicta, however, as the communications at issue in that case preceded § 7525’s 
effective date, and courts have not since imposed a strict “legal advice” requirement.  One court has cited 
Frederick for the “lawyers’ work” proposition, but held only that tax return preparation did not qualify as 
“lawyers’ work,” without further suggesting that a FATP must actually be engaged in the practice of law.  
United States v.KPMG, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002).  It is unlikely that a court will explicitly hold 
that a FATP must perform lawyers’ work (something that FATPs are barred by law from doing), but it is 
possible.  
102 See BDO, discussed supra Part IV.A.  
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proceedings and only against the IRS.103 Given that the privilege is usually unavailable to 
the client, protecting the confidentiality of her communications is nearly impossible, 104 and 
Congress could not possibly have required her to do so. 
The close relationship between a taxpayer’s state and federal income tax liabilities   
illustrates the fragility of the FATP privilege. Whenever a taxpayer’s federal income tax 
liability is at issue, his state income tax liability is also likely at issue—most states determine 
a taxpayer’s income tax liability by reference to his federal income tax liability.105 
Consequently, a state tax agency may seek disclosure of a taxpayer’s communications with 
advisor as part of its determination of the taxpayer’s tax liability.  Because state law 
generally does not provide a privilege comparable to § 7525,106 the disclosure of these 
communications is easily compelled. 
The communications produced by the client will almost certainly constitute “tax 
advice” within the meaning of § 7525—that is, by complying with the request from the state 
 
103 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2).  See Chao v. Koresko, Slip Copy, 2005 WL 2521886 (3rd Cir. 2005) (“We agree with 
the District Court that the tax preparer privilege does not apply here….This case, a civil proceeding by DOL to 
enforce an administrative subpoena, is [outside the scope of the statute]. Respondents’ primary concern seems 
to be that DOL will share information it receives with the IRS, but they have not cited any authority that 
expands the tax preparer privilege beyond its express statutory limits.”) and Doe v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. 
Supp. 2d 627, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (“[Section 7525] is limited to ‘any noncriminal tax proceeding before the 
[IRS]’ and ‘any noncriminal tax proceeding in Federal court brought by or against the United States.’ 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7525(a)(2). This case does not fall within one of these limitations, as there is clearly no proceeding in which 
the United States has appeared, and the issuance of an administrative summons to a bank, as opposed to a 
taxpayer, does not appear to be a ‘tax proceeding’ before the IRS.”). 
104 See e.g., Louis F. Lobenhofer, The New Tax Practitioner Privilege:  Limited Privilege And Significant 
Disruption, 26 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 243, 255-256 (“Because [the privilege] applies only to tax matters, the non-
lawyer FATP could be required to disclose information revealed in confidential tax planning interviews to other 
federal agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission or Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. A 
party opposing an FATP’s client in federal civil litigation could also force the FATP to disclose client 
confidences.”).    
105 See Harley T. Duncan, Tax Administrators Detail State Use of IRS Tax Data, 1999 TNT 214-26 (November 
5, 1999) (“37 of the 42 states with a broad-based income tax conform to a ‘federal starting point,’ i.e., they 
begin the calculation of state income tax liability with a federal figure. Twenty-six states begin with Adjusted 
Gross Income, 8 states with federal taxable income, and 3 states base state tax liability on federal tax liability.”).   
106 While a few states do provide accountant-client privileges, the FATP privilege reaches communications 
made not only to accountants, but to enrolled agents and enrolled actuaries as well.  Communications made to 
agents and actuaries do not enjoy any state-law privilege protections. 
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revenue authority, the client will have revealed information pertinent to the determination of 
his federal tax liability.107 The IRS could then argue that the client has waived the FATP 
privilege by disclosing the tax-related communications to the state revenue authority, and ask 
that a court compel disclosure.108 
It’s hard to believe that Congress intended such an “eggshell” waiver of the privilege.  
Congress could not have enacted § 7525 with the intention that it would be dead on arrival.  
A court’s rejection of the selective waiver doctrine, however, could very well vitiate the 
privilege entirely.109 
The courts should recognize that the arguments for requiring a client to maintain the 
confidentiality of his communications with his attorney are inapposite to the client-tax 
practitioner relationship.  Section 7525’s text indicates that the substance of the taxpayer’s 
communications will be freely discoverable by various federal and state agencies.110 A
taxpayer will never make communications to his nonattorney tax advisor believing that such 
communications will be held confidential, and it is not sensible to impose a confidentiality 
 
107 See Jonathan Z. Ackerman, With Privilege Comes Responsibility:  The New Accountant-Client Privilege”, 
Federal Bar Association Section of Taxation Report, Summer 1999, 1999-SUM Fed. B.A. Sec. Tax’n Rep. 1 
(“[D]isclosures during the course of a state tax audit in a state without accountant-client privilege could leave a 
confidential client information prone to discovery in a subsequent IRS investigation.”).  A client could perhaps 
avoid this result by hiring one accountant to prepare his state tax return and another to prepare his federal tax 
return. 
108 See also Chelsea A. Helme, Preserving the Confidentiality Privilege, 1999 TNT 156-2 (August 2, 1999) 
(“For example, they said, if the state tax advice is based on federal tax advice, the federal aspects may be 
privileged against the IRS, but not against the state taxing authority….[T]he client could face a potential waiver 
situation when the communication is provided to the state tax authority.”). 
109 See also Alicia K. Corcoran, The Accountant-Client Privilege:  A Prescription For Confidentiality Or Just A 
Placebo?, 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 697, 712 (2000) (“This backdoor approach to obtaining information is a large 
gap in the [FATP] privilege to which the attorney-client relationship is not subject, and it severely thwarts the 
privilege’s purpose of allowing ‘taxpayers to consult with other qualified tax advisors in the same manner they 
currently may consult with advisors that are licensed to practice law.’”). 
110 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2).  See also Alyson Petroni, Unpacking The Accountant-Client Privilege Under I.R.C. 
Section 7525, 18 Va. Tax Rev. 843, 858 (1998) ([The FATP’s] limitations may serve to destroy the very 
privilege that section 7525 just created because taxpayers are left completely exposed to testimony by their 
accountants in all private civil actions, all criminal proceedings, and in civil tax proceedings where written 
communications regarding corporate tax shelters are involved.).  
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requirement.111 Section 7525 does not serve the broad purposes of encouraging full and 
frank communications between a taxpayer and his tax advisor, but instead creates a narrow 
privilege for a narrow purpose.   
B.  Recommended approach 
A taxpayer should be able to assert the FATP privilege against the IRS, 
notwithstanding any previous disclosures to government agencies.112 Concluding otherwise 
may destroy the privilege entirely, rendering the statute a dead letter.  There are at least three 
approaches that a court can use to ensure the viability of the FATP privilege. 
The simplest approach would involve a court’s adoption of the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Diversified. A court may conclude that, with respect to the FATP privilege, the 
selective waiver doctrine furthers important public policies. In turn, the doctrine should apply 
to the privilege.   
 
111 Indeed, as two practitioners observe, “Many accounting firms are no longer advising their clients that the 
privilege will protect their confidential communications.”  Smith & Kleinman, supra note 4.  It’s hard to 
imagine that anyone would reveal his deepest held confidences to his tax advisor, given that those confidences 
are protected only vis-à-vis the IRS.  The privilege cannot possibly serve the purpose of encouraging full and 
frank communications between taxpayers and their tax preparers, and taxpayers should not be expected to guard 
the communications as if it did.  See also Robert T. Smith, After the Alamo: Taxpayer Claims of Privilege and 
the IRS War on Tax Shelters, Tax Notes, Jan. 13, 2003 (“[T]he privilege afforded to tax practitioners is so 
narrow and uncertain in its application that clients should exercise extreme caution before disclosing 
information to a nonattorney tax practitioner that is intended to remain privileged.”). 
112 The second and third approaches suggested would allow a client to continue to claim the FATP privilege 
notwithstanding previous disclosures to private litigants as well.  This paper focuses primarily on the impact of 
previous disclosures to government agencies, however, as the government’s institution of parallel agency 
investigations has caused the most concern.  See, e.g., Mary Jo White, The Current Enforcement Environment:  
The Best of Times/The Worst of Times-  Can We Reach a Reasonable Middle Ground?, Practising Law Institute, 
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, 1456 PLI/Corp 997  (“[T]he use (and, at times, abuse) of 
parallel proceedings has increased dramatically in the current corporate scandal climate. One result is that the 
companies feel tremendous pressure to settle with the SEC or Attorney General on the civil side on terms they 
consider far beyond fair in order to lift the crushing weight and adverse publicity of long-running parallel civil 
and criminal investigations, as well as the threat of a company-threatening criminal indictment.”) and Sheryl 
Stratton, Government Defends Parallel Proceedings On Shelters While Lawyers Seek Brighter Lines, 2006 TNT 
67-5 (April 6, 2006).  The government, of course, would not coordinate with a private party an investigation 
into a taxpayer’s affairs—i.e. a “backdoor” waiver of the FATP privilege is less likely to occur.  Nonetheless, 
under the arguments stated in Part IV.B., a taxpayer’s previous disclosure to a private party adversary should 
not waive the privilege vis-à-vis the IRS. 
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This approach, though simple, stands on a shaky theoretical foundation.  The FATP 
privilege is quite different from the attorney-client privilege, and applying jurisprudence on 
the latter when construing the former is questionable.113 Further, courts that have summarily 
rejected the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning may find it unpalatable (or even hypocritical) to adopt 
it when a FATP privilege would issue. 
Another approach would call for a court to refine its definition of “involuntary 
disclosure” in the context of testimonial privileges.  To protect the FATP privilege from 
“eggshell” waiver, a court can adopt a definition of involuntary disclosure similar to that 
found in Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 512. Rule 512 provides that a disclosure is 
involuntary if it is “made without opportunity to claim the privilege.”  Because a taxpayer 
has no opportunity to claim the FATP privilege against anyone other than the IRS, any 
disclosure to (for example) the SEC in a securities-related proceeding would be deemed 
involuntary, and the privilege would be preserved—only voluntary disclosures waive the 
privilege.  A few circuits have, in fact, followed Rule 512 with respect to the attorney-client 
privilege, and perhaps the FATP privilege is safe in those jurisdictions.114 The First Circuit, 
though, is obviously hostile to the Rule.115 
113 Of course, courts have done just that.  See supra Part III.A. 
114 See Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 242 (D. Md. 2005) (describing courts 
that have followed Proposed Rule of Evidence 512).  
115 The First Circuit in MIT concluded that a voluntary disclosure occurs whenever a client voluntarily places 
himself in a position to disclose, even if the actual disclosure was compelled by a statute or regulation.  Under a 
broad reading of MIT, a taxpayer who engaged in the conduct of a business in State A and who, pursuant to 
statute, disclosed tax-related communications to the State A tax agency could be deemed to have voluntarily 
engaged in business in the state, and thus have voluntarily waived the privilege.  The IRS made a similar 
argument in NSAR 11,040, though the document’s heavy redaction makes it difficult to determine the precise 
circumstances surrounding the taxpayer’s disclosures.  IRS NSAR 11,040 (2000) (“The opinion letter was 
provided to the Attorney General and Master solely to gain an advantage, i.e. to solicit the concurrence of the 
recipients in the decision of ***, *** and *** to reorganize. The taxpayers did not have to reorganize. *** made 
that decision which ultimately was advanced by their soliciting and producing an opinion letter analyzing the 
tax consequences of the restructuring. There was no compulsion, either statutory or judicial.”).  The redacted 
facts do not indicate whether the taxpayer disclosed without an opportunity to claim the privilege, but the IRS 
suggested that because the underlying business transaction was undertaken voluntarily, any disclosures made to 
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A third approach would acknowledge that the FATP privilege is a product of statute 
and does not necessarily carry the same requirements that the attorney-client privilege 
carries.  Specifically, a court could conclude that there is no “confidentiality” requirement 
with respect to the FATP privilege.  Since a client’s tax-related communications are 
generally discoverable by private parties and government agencies, the statute (unless read 
literally) could not possibly impose a confidentiality requirement on the FATP privilege.116 
Under this approach, courts do not even need to bother with the doctrine of selective 
waiver.  Courts usually reject the selective waiver doctrine because it is inconsistent with the 
attorney-client privilege’s confidentiality requirement.117 If the FATP privilege carries no 
such requirement, there is no need to even analyze whether a “selective waiver” is 
inconsistent with the privilege.  However, this approach requires courts to retreat from their 
insistence that the attorney-client privilege’s confidentiality requirement applies with equal 
force to the FATP privilege, and they may be hesitant to depart from their earlier precedents. 
Of the three approaches described, the third (though not perfect) is probably the best.  
The first approach—adopting Diversified—unnecessarily entangles a court’s attorney-client 
privilege jurisprudence with its FATP privilege jurisprudence.  A court should be hesitant to 
define the FATP privilege by reference to attorney-client privilege cases.118 Similarly, the 
Rule 512 approach is less than ideal.  If a court adopts Rule 512 with respect to the FATP 
 
the State were voluntary as well.  Id. But, some language in the NSAR suggests that the IRS will accept that a 
disclosure made pursuant to statute is involuntary.  (“To the extent [the district court’s holding] suggests that 
compliance with banking laws is not voluntary and that compliance is not in any way related to any decision by 
the party providing the record, that case is distinguishable and not inconsistent with Steinhardt.”).  NSAR 
11,040 is no less confusing than the judicial decisions addressing the selective waiver doctrine.  Those 
disinclined to parse its cryptic reasoning may take comfort knowing that the ruling lacks precedential value.  
See I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3). 
116 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2). 
117 See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1427 (3rd Cir. 
1991)(“[U]nder traditional waiver doctrine a voluntary disclosure to a third party waives the attorney-client 
privilege even if the third party agrees not to disclose the communications to anyone else.”). 
118 See supra Part IV.A.ii. 
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privilege, it is obliged to adopt it with respect to other testimonial privileges, lest it is 
comfortable creating inconsistent standards among privileges.  A court’s conclusion that a 
disclosure made without the opportunity to claim a privilege is involuntary when the FATP 
privilege is at issue—but voluntary when other testimonial privileges are at issue—would be 
difficult to justify.  A court might not be prepared to adopt Rule 512 wholesale, and this 
approach might not appeal to some courts. 
Contrarily, if a court decides that § 7525 does not carry a confidentiality requirement, 
that conclusion would be grounded in the statute’s text.  The lack of symmetry between the 
FATP privilege and other testimonial privileges would thus not be cause for concern.119 
Indeed, Congress granted the privilege an extremely limited scope, and a reasonable 
inference is that the communications protected by the statute need not be kept confidential.120 
Though it may seem odd that a testimonial privilege could attach to widely disclosed 
communications, § 7525 is itself a very odd statute.121 
V.  Legislative History 
 Though the case for selective waiver seems strong, section 7525’s legislative history 
might refute the approach described above.  While its use is controversial,122 legislative 
 
119 Though Congress granted the judiciary the authority to define testimonial privileges, that power is subject to 
any contrary act of Congress.   See Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 
120 See supra Part IV.A.ii. 
121 The privilege should be available vis-à-vis the IRS even if the agency obtains access to the privileged 
communications through other means (e.g by seeking privileged documents from another agency that has 
compelled their disclosure).  Again, it may seem odd to bar the IRS from using documents in its possession, but 
this “now you see it now you don’t” approach is not completely unprecedented.  See Richard L. Marcus, The 
Perils of Privilege:  Waiver and the Litigator, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1605, 1635-36 (“In inadvertent disclosure 
cases, courts that enter privilege-preservation orders sometimes provide that privileged materials be returned 
once identified as such.”). 
122 Compare, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) (Thomas, J., for the Court) (“Floor 
statements from two Senators cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason 
to give greater weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses, which are 
memorialized in the unambiguous statutory text.”) with 534 U.S. at 469 (“[T]he Court’s cavalier treatment of 
the explanations of the statute provided to their colleagues by Senators Rockefeller and Wallop is disrespectful, 
not only to those Senators, but to the entire Senate as well.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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history continues to receive some authoritative weight in statutory interpretation.123 Thus, 
such history must be examined in order to complete this paper’s analysis. 
 In NSAR 11,040, the IRS quoted the following statement from the Conference 
Committee Report accompanying the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act: 
The privilege between the client and accountant can be waived in the same 
manner as the attorney client privilege.  If the taxpayer discloses to a third 
party the substance of a communication protected by the privilege, the 
privilege for that communication and any related communications is 
considered to be waived to the same extent and in the same manner as the 
privilege would be waived if the disclosure related to an attorney client 
communication.124 
Relying in part on this statement, the Service concluded that the judiciary’s rejection of the 
selective waiver doctrine with respect to the attorney-client privilege applied with equal force 
to the FATP privilege.125 
The Service’s reliance on the committee report is questionable.  The text of the statute 
does not replicate the “same waiver” rule found in the committee report.  In fact, the narrow 
scope of the privilege, as indicated by § 7525(a)(2), suggests just the opposite.  
Further, a committee report represents (at most) the subjective intentions of the 
committee members—it cannot possibly serve as an authoritative expression of 
Congressional intent.126 Congress speaks, and thereby communicates its “intent,” only 
 
123 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (“the following are authority for purposes of determining whether 
there is substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item…congressional intent as reflected in committee 
reports, joint explanatory statements of managers included in conference committee reports, and floor 
statements made prior to enactment by one of a bill’s managers; General Explanations of tax legislation 
prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation (the Blue Book)”). 
124 IRS NSAR 11,040 (2000) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-599) (emphasis supplied). 
125 See supra Part III.B. 
126 Congressional “intent” should be defined not by the thoughts floating around in the legislators’ heads, but 
instead by the intent that a reasonable member of the public would infer from an examination of the statutory 
text (i.e. an “objectified” intent).  See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 17 (Princeton University Press, 
1997).  The powers granted to the legislature by the Constitution are to be exercised in favor of the people, and 
not the legislators.  See U.S. Const., Preamble.   Thus, it follows that statutory language should be defined in the 
context that the public understands those words, and not the context in which legislators understand them.  
Using legislative history places one the wrong side of the analysis—the question is what the readers of the 
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through the Statutes at Large.127 Neither House of Congress voted on the committee report, 
and the report was not presented to the President for signature.128 Legislative history 
materials should not receive any authoritative weight whatsoever in statutory 
interpretation.129 
statute would objectively understand, rather than what the writers subjectively intended.  See  Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899) (“We do not inquire what the 
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”).    
127 See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 68 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Congress conveys its directions in the 
Statutes at Large, not in excerpts from the Congressional Record.”). 
128 An oft-cited floor exchange between two legislators reflects the perils of assuming that a committee report 
reflects the intentions of the legislature as a whole:   
Mr. ARMSTRONG. . . . My question, which may take [the chairman of the Committee on Finance] by surprise, 
is this: Is it the intention of the chairman that the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court and other courts 
take guidance as to the intention of Congress from the committee report which accompanies this bill? 
Mr. DOLE. I would certainly hope so. . . . 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, will the Senator tell me whether or not he wrote the committee report? 
Mr. DOLE. Did I write the committee report? 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes. 
Mr. DOLE. No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the committee report. 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did any Senator write the committee report? 
Mr. DOLE. I have to check. 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Does the Senator know of any Senator who wrote the committee report? 
Mr. DOLE. I might be able to identify one, but I would have to search. I was here all during the time it was 
written, I might say, and worked carefully with the staff as they worked. . . . 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, has the Senator from Kansas, the chairman of the Finance Committee, read 
the committee report in its entirety? 
Mr. DOLE. I am working on it. It is not a bestseller, but I am working on it. 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, did members of the Finance Committee vote on the committee report? 
Mr. DOLE. No. 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, the reason I raise the issue is not perhaps apparent on the surface, and let me 
just state it: . . . . The report itself is not considered by the Committee on Finance. It was not subject to 
amendment by the Committee on Finance. It is not subject to amendment now by the Senate. 
. . . If there were matter within this report which was disagreed to by the Senator from Colorado or even by a 
majority of all Senators, there would be no way for us to change the report. I could not offer an amendment 
tonight to amend the committee report. 
. . . For any jurist, administrator, bureaucrat, tax practitioner, or others who might chance upon the written 
record of this proceeding, let me just make the point that this is not the law, it was not voted on, it is not subject 
to amendment, and we should discipline ourselves to the task of expressing congressional intent in the statute. 
128 CONG. REC. S8659 (daily ed. July 19, 1982) ((as quoted in Hirschey v. F.E.R.C., 777 F.2d 1, 6, 7-8 n.1 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  Even if one could prove that all Congressmen had in fact read a 
committee report, the report could not be treated as an authoritative expression of Congressional intent.  The 
Constitution prescribes rigorous procedures that must be observed before a text can be enacted into law.  See 
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  Merely thinking about a text (no matter how hard) is insufficient.  See also 
Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1844) (“If every member of the legislature had preferred that the 
regulations under the act of 1832 should not have been sanctioned by that of 1833, it would not have been 
effective to repeal the act of 1832, unless they had expressed their wish in a legislative form.”) (emphasis 
supplied). 
129 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action 
in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be 
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These objections notwithstanding, the IRS continues to give legislative history 
materials (and legislators’ subjective intentions) authoritative weight.130 Upon examining § 
7525’s legislative history, the Service inferred that Congress had the “same waiver” rule in 
mind when it enacted the statute.  Consequently, the IRS concluded that since a disclosure to 
a government agency waives the attorney-client privilege, the same must hold true for the 
FATP privilege. 
 Assuming momentarily that legislative history materials are relevant, it is hardly clear 
that the “same waiver” rule should apply in the manner described—the Service’s position is 
based on incomplete analysis of § 7525’s legislative history.   The Senate Report 
accompanying the Restructuring Act also contains statements pertinent to the applicability of 
the selective waiver doctrine.  The Report states: 
The privilege granted by the provision may only be asserted in noncriminal 
tax proceedings before the IRS and in the Federal Courts with regard to such 
noncriminal tax matters in proceedings where the IRS is a party. The privilege 
may not be asserted to prevent the disclosure of information to any regulatory 
body other than the IRS. The ability of any other regulatory body, including 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to gain or compel 
information is unchanged by the provision. No privilege may be asserted 
under this provision by a taxpayer in dealings with such other regulatory 
bodies in an administrative or court proceeding. 
 
As this statement shows, Congress131 was aware that communications protected by the FATP 
privilege would be readily disclosed to the SEC and other regulatory agencies.  Congress 
 
exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”).  Though the courts 
have yet to reject the use of legislative history wholesale, the weight given to subjective intentions has dwindled 
in recent years.  See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 437 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The 
legislative history argument does not persuade us. The prototypical transaction Congress had in mind in drafting 
§ 357(c)(3) may well have been one in which a corporation exchanged liabilities as part of a transfer of an entire 
trade or business to a controlled subsidiary, but nothing in the section’s plain language embraces such a 
limitation.”).   
130 See supra note 123. 
131 The Senate Report is treated as a statement of Congress solely for the purposes of refuting the IRS’s 
interpretation of § 7525’s legislative history.  As a general matter, such reports should not serve as a statement 
of the legislature’s intent.  Though courts sometime “believ[e] that what is said by a single person in a floor 
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contemplated parallel proceedings by the government, and did not suggest that such 
proceedings should operate to vitiate the privilege.  Rather, Congress recognized that the 
SEC could compel disclosure of the taxpayer’s communications, and that the privilege could 
continue to be asserted during noncriminal tax proceedings.  
 Admittedly, this analysis of the legislative history is uncertain.  It is very difficult to 
determine what individual Congressmen were thinking when they voted in favor of § 7525’s 
enactment. A search for such subjective intent may be futile.132 
The Senate Report should nonetheless call the IRS’s conclusions into question.  The 
Service cited the portion of the legislative history suggesting the “same waiver” rule, but did 
not cite the portion contemplating preservation of the privilege during parallel proceedings.  
As the Supreme Court warns, “investigation of legislative history has a tendency to 
become…an exercise in ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”133 In NSAR 
11,040, the Service picked out a friendly face, but ignored an even meaner scowl. 
In any event, this paper’s conclusions are based on a textual approach to the FATP 
privilege’s interpretation.  Under this approach, no statement in § 7525’s legislative history is 
treated as an authoritative expression of Congressional intent, regardless of whether it 
supports or rebuts this paper’s conclusions.  A textual reading of the statute should lead one 
to the conclusion that a disclosure of tax-related communications to a third party does not 
waive the FATP privilege.  On the other hand, if one adopts an intentionalist (or even a 
 
debate or by a committee report represents the view of Congress as a whole….[t]here is no basis either in law or 
in reality for this naive belief.”  Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1991 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).   
132 See Hon. Maura D. Corrigan & J. Michael Thomas, “Dice Loading” Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 59 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 231, 238 (“Judges cannot depose legislators to ask them what they meant to say. 
Courts have no institutional capacity to discover what each individual legislator subjectively believed. Even if 
courts had that ability, they lack the authority to elevate legislators’ subjective intentions above the law itself. 
The law, not the lawmaker’s intent, is what matters in our system of government.”). 
133 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2626 (2005) (Kennedy, J., for the Court) (quoting 
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 
195, 214 (1983) (quoting the late Judge Harold Leventhal)). 
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literalist) approach to interpretation, he could possibly conclude that the selective waiver 
doctrine is inapplicable. 
VI.  Conclusion. 
Courts should save § 7525 from imminent death and adopt the selective waiver 
doctrine whenever the FATP privilege is at issue.  Though courts may have rejected the 
doctrine in the attorney-client privilege context, Congress did not instruct them to 
mechanistically apply attorney-client privilege principles to the FATP privilege.  The FATP 
privilege serves purposes different from those served by common law attorney-client 
privilege, and equation of the two is inappropriate.    
Unfortunately, even if the doctrine is accepted, the privilege will remain in critical 
condition.  Under information sharing agreements with state revenue authorities, the IRS may 
be able to sidestep § 7525 and obtain privileged communications directly.134 The IRS has 
even issued an administrative summons to a state tax agency, successfully compelling the 
release of sensitive taxpayer information.135 As the case law surrounding the FATP privilege 
continues to develop, Congress should determine whether courts have rendered § 7525 a 
dead letter, and amend the statute to clarify its intent. 
Some commentators have argued that the enactment of § 7525 reflects a bad policy 
decision.136 The statute resulted from intense lobbying by the accounting industry, and it is 
 
134 See Duncan, supra note 105. 
135 See Martini v. United States,  97 A.F.T.R.2d 2592 (D. Nev. 2006) (“[T]he court agrees with the analysis of 
those cases concerning the authority to subpoena state agencies and concludes that the IRS may constitutionally 
subpoena records of individual taxpayers from the Nevada Department of Taxation.”). 
136 See generally Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying 
Evidentiary Privileges, 25 Va. Tax Rev 583 (2006);  Steve R. Johnson, The Proposed Tax Advisor-Client 
Privilege: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Come, 78 Tax Notes 1041 (1998).  One practitioner has even 
suggested that elimination of the attorney-client privilege (with respect to civil tax proceedings) may serve the 
public interest.  See Bruce Kayle, The Tax Adviser’s Privilege in Transactional Matters: A Synopsis and a 
Suggestion, 54 Tax Lawyer 509, 550-553. (2001).  Though these commentators’ arguments are convincing, 
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hardly clear that the privilege operates to further the public interest.  However, this second-
guessing cannot justify the judiciary’s hostility to the privilege.  The courts are obliged to 
effectuate the legislature’s intent, not substitute their own for that of Congress’s.  Adopting 
the selective waiver doctrine with respect to the FATP privilege would be a good step 
towards fulfilling this obligation. 
 
courts should be reminded that the task of repeal ultimately belongs to Congress.  They should endeavor to give 
§ 7525 a hospitable interpretation, even if its enactment reflects a poor policy choice. 
